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Headlong into the Polanyian Dilemma: 
The Impact of Middle-Class Moral Panic on the British 
Government’s Response to the Subprime Crisis 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
During his time as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown’s Treasury promoted 
the move towards asset-based welfare in Britain and found a number of innovative 
ways to reward those who embraced it.  This article focuses on the discursive 
construction of a middle-class moral panic occasioned by the distress caused to self-
styled ‘responsible mortgage borrowers’ by recent falling house prices.  In the context 
of the move towards asset-based welfare the subprime crisis has manifested itself 
most obviously in the popular consciousness as a threat to housing market wealth.  
The British Government has used the political space opened up by the narrative of 
middle-class moral panic in order to protect banks’ balance sheets from the 
consequences of their own failed investments in mortgage-backed securities.  The 
ensuing arrangements have immunised banks from the implications of market self-
regulation whilst simultaneously allowing them to continue to impose the experience 
of market self-regulation on their customers.  This creates an increasingly asymmetric 
approach to banking regulation analogous to that which Karl Polanyi associated with 
the contradictory co-existence of market and non-market forms.  Polanyi described it 
as a genuine dilemma when governments felt compelled to introduce long-term 
contradictions into the social basis of the economy as a temporary palliative for short-
term economic disturbances.  The British Government’s first phase response to the 
subprime crisis – in part galvanised by and in part rationalised by middle-class moral 
panic concerning accumulated housing market wealth – appears consistent with such 
a characterisation. 
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Introduction 
 
On December 3 2008, the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, announced a two-
year mortgage interest holiday for households unable to maintain their repayments in 
the event of an unexpected loss of income (Prime Minister’s Office 2008).1  The 
Government offered temporary guarantees on housing market loans of up to 
£400,000, using public money to ensure that mortgage lenders continued to receive 
their payments whilst simultaneously allowing cash-strapped households to defer their 
repayments without fear of having their homes repossessed.  This figure was high 
enough to provide complete coverage for 90% of British households.  In its front-page 
headline the following day, the conservative newspaper, the Daily Mail, heralded the 
introduction of a ‘Mortgage Safety Net for Middle Classes’.  Another equally 
conservative newspaper struck a similar tone in its front-page headline on the same 
day, congratulating itself for securing ‘Victory in Daily Express Crusade’ for state-
sponsored middle-class mortgage insurance. 
 
In this article I argue that the announcement of a largely open-ended Government 
commitment to use mortgage insurance to protect house prices was emblematic of the 
cultural politics of the first phase of the subprime crisis in Britain.  This phase lasted 
from the first signs that house prices had begun to fall in October 2007 to the first 
confirmation at the beginning of 2009 that the credit crunch had led the economy into 
recession.  The focal point of Government activity in the intervening period was the 
relationship between the distress of the inter-bank credit system and the downward 
pressure on house prices.  In general, the Government ignored issues of housing 
affordability and the constrained access into private homeownership for first-time 
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buyers.  Instead, it concentrated on trying to protect wealth already accumulated on 
the housing market.  In this way it reacted very much in line with the prevailing 
construction of middle-class interests. 
 
The analysis revolves around two core contentions: (i) that a middle-class moral panic 
surrounding falling house prices was successfully initiated in Britain in the first phase 
of the subprime crisis; and (ii) that this phenomenon impacted decisively to shape the 
Government’s positive response to banks’ bailout demands.  Moral panic is revealed 
to be a political technique designed to provide reassurance for those whose mortgage 
borrowing practices had helped to propel the recent house price bubble but whose 
credit status did not label them personally as ‘subprime’.  It does so by drawing 
empathetic boundaries around a purely fictitious category of innocent victim: namely, 
the middle-class homeowner constituted as the ‘responsible mortgage borrower’.  The 
culpability of such people in riding the house price bubble for all it was worth plays 
no part in this construction, the purpose of which was to position middle-class 
homeowners as deserving beneficiaries of the Government’s attempts to steer a course 
through the difficulties emanating from the banks’ balance sheet mess. 
 
A consistent political logic underpinned all of the Brown Government’s attempts to 
rejuvenate the inter-bank credit system in the first phase of the subprime crisis.  The 
Special Liquidity Scheme launched by the Bank of England in April 2008 and 
extended that September; the Treasury’s purchase of public stakes in banks 
throughout the autumn of 2008; the Crosby Report into the future functioning of the 
mortgage lending market published in November 2008; and the establishment of a 
£200 billion public insurance fund against banks’ bad debts in January 2009: each of 
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these interventions contained the same dual structure.  The most obvious short-term 
economic objective was to underwrite banks’ balance sheet positions in order to 
reduce the prospect of a systemic banking collapse.  Yet, it was only possible for the 
Government to implement such measures because they were consistent with middle-
class interests in defending housing market wealth accumulated during the recent 
bubble.  The successful initiation of a middle-class moral panic surrounding the 
damage caused to self-styled responsible mortgage borrowers by falling house prices 
conferred an important sense of legitimacy onto the Government’s rescue plans for 
the banks, even though the banks’ problems were of their own making. 
 
The argument is developed in three stages.  In the first section, I use the work of Karl 
Polanyi to argue that the resulting situation is highly unstable.  Government 
interventions protected the banks’ right to use the price mechanism as the sole 
regulator of their core mortgage business: mortgage lending continued to be 
conducted at market prices and mortgage repayment schedules calculated likewise.  
At the same time, those interventions released banks from the responsibility of 
managing their own balance sheet positions according to regulation by the price 
mechanism: public underwriting of banks’ bad debts sheltered them from the effects 
of adverse price movements in their holdings of mortgage-backed securities.  From a 
Polanyian perspective, the outcome is a complex series of asymmetric relationships 
which portend a future social rupture.  The second and third sections focus on how 
such a situation came about.  They do so by studying the content of the middle-class 
moral panic and charting its legitimating effect on the bank bailouts which themselves 
create additional susceptibility to social instability. 
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Bank Bailouts and Polanyian Instability 
 
The scale of the Brown Government’s interventions aimed at restoring the banks to 
health is noteworthy in itself for its largely open-ended commitments to assistance.  
But from a Polanyian perspective the nature of the bailouts is as notable as their scale.  
It is particularly significant that the bailout packages, whilst focusing on stabilising 
the mortgage lending market, provided public authorities with no automatic additional 
oversight of the process through which mortgage lending is priced. 
 
The British house price bubble which finally burst in October 2007 was propelled by 
conspicuous over-lending by banks in the absence of appropriate stress-testing of 
borrowers’ exposure to changing housing market conditions.  The justification for 
even the worst excesses of gratuitous mortgage lending – including the failed 
Northern Rock Bank’s now infamous 125% specialist loan-to-value mortgage (e.g., 
Walters 2008) – was that this corresponded directly to the prevailing market price of 
mortgage lending (see also Shiller 2008, 123-38).  Using Polanyi’s terminology it was 
evidence of an ostensibly self-regulating market, one in which activity is coordinated 
not by the broader objectives of social policy but solely by price signals generated 
within the market (Polanyi 1957 [1944], 68-76).  The bailout packages put in place by 
the Brown Government did nothing to alter this basic characteristic of the mortgage 
lending market in Britain.  The terms on which mortgage lending was made available 
to British households became noticeably more demanding in the wake of the subprime 
crisis, but this was only because price signals were then deemed to have changed 
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accordingly.  In Polanyi’s framework (ibid., 168) this is equivalent to the pricing 
structure which coordinates mortgage lending being disembedded from society. 
 
The disjuncture between the respective political positions of the banks and of society 
is evident here.  Whilst the banks operate a disembedded mortgage lending market in 
order to profit from changing price signals, society – or at least that proportion of it 
enjoying access to owner-occupation – remains fully embedded into the banks’ 
mortgage business.  The individual homeowner’s ability to meet mortgage 
repayments involves abstention from immediate consumption, and the contractual 
requirement to meet such repayments necessitates a constant flow of savings from 
households to the banks who act as mortgage lenders.  It is only in the presence of 
such flows that the technical capacity to price a mortgage can be turned into a 
sustainable business (see also Leyshon and French in this issue).  Banks could not 
make money out of selling mortgages were it not for the fully embedded position of 
society within their business operations.  This is what makes it politically noteworthy 
that the use of public money to capitalise bank bailout packages was not accompanied 
by restrictions on banks’ right to operate their mortgage lending business as 
something which appears to their customers to be a self-regulating market.  The 
market rate for mortgage loans and mortgage repayments continued to be determined 
purely by the banks’ interpretation of price signals within the market, even after the 
Government’s interventions to correct a clear instance of market failure. 
 
The crucial distinction activated by the bailout packages is that those same signals 
came to mean little for the valuation of banks’ balance sheet positions and their 
overall ability to continue as going concerns.  In April 2008 the Government 
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introduced the Special Liquidity Scheme in order to make it easier to safeguard the 
integrity of the banks’ balance sheets.  The measures instructed the Bank of England 
to provide banks with massive amounts of additional liquidity by allowing them to 
swap mortgage-backed securities for newly issued government bonds (Bank of 
England 2008).  The latter are of markedly higher credit grade than, and come with 
none of the depreciation risk of, the mortgage-backed securities now popularly 
dubbed ‘toxic assets’.  The creation of new public debt to engineer these swaps 
enabled banks to cleanse their balance sheets of large numbers of seriously damaged 
assets by replacing them with highly saleable assets containing almost zero default 
risk.  Of course, private over-the-counter markets existed throughout the first phase of 
the subprime crisis in actual swap instruments priced at market rates, but the banks 
were unable to revitalise their balance sheet positions using this mechanism because 
of just how much the prevailing market rate depreciated the book value of their assets.  
The mortgage-backed securities were considered to be of such low quality that there 
was no commercial viability in selling them at market prices: banks would simply 
have bankrupted themselves by doing so. 
 
At the time of writing – May 2009 – hedge funds were the only private investors still 
willing to buy mortgage-backed securities, but in general their offers were at roughly 
a 90% discount on the book value required to maintain balance sheet health (Muolo 
and Padilla 2008, 274-5).  The Brown Government stepped in to ensure that banks did 
not have to react to new price signals emerging from the mortgage securitisation 
market in order to revalue their mortgage-backed securities at ten pence to the pound 
of their former book value.  The Bank of England now holds on behalf of the 
Government the toxic assets linked to banks’ mortgage securitisation strategies, thus 
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leaving a hole in the market value of the public finances equivalent to the direct 
gifting of the additional liquidity.  Moreover, the recommendations of the Crosby 
Report of November 2008 extended the gift analogy.  They provided for the purchase 
of banks’ seriously damaged mortgage-backed securities at their former rather than 
present value using Bank of England cash reserves rather than government debt (HM 
Treasury 2008). 
 
As such, the price mechanism was subverted as a response to banks’ balance sheet 
disarray during the subprime crisis.  The price mechanism was considered to be an 
adequate regulatory device for the period in which pricing mortgage-backed securities 
in line with market rates provided sizeable profits under mark-to-model accounting 
techniques (see also Crouch in this issue).  But as soon as those same techniques 
produced balance sheet positions which threatened banks’ very existence public 
authorities intervened to ensure that banks no longer had to experience the pressures 
of holding seriously damaged assets.  The process of pumping extra liquidity into the 
banking sector had the effect of enabling the banks to ‘sell’ many of their remaining 
mortgage-backed securities at way above the market rate dictated by price signals. 
 
The essence of the interventions was to facilitate non-market sales for the banks at the 
same time as protecting the banks’ right to conduct only market sales with its 
customers.  Households who enter the mortgage lending market remain exposed to 
market sales: price signals continue to inform them that they are paying for their own 
mistakes when it becomes apparent in retrospect that they have purchased over-priced 
houses.  By contrast, banks have been relieved of the responsibilities inherent in 
exposure to market sales: government interventions ensured that they did not have to 
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pay for their own mistakes when subsequent price signals confirmed that they wildly 
over-valued the purchase price of mortgage-backed securities. 
 
Viewing these arrangements through a Polanyian lens, good reasons emerge for 
worrying about their potential stability.  What has emerged is a patchwork of different 
regulatory principles embodying aspects of both the market and the non-market form.  
The generic disembeddedness of finance remains dominant, and it is clear from the 
text accompanying the bailout packages that in the first phase of the subprime crisis 
the Brown Government did not even contemplate exercising its ownership rights over 
the banks as direct control of their activities (e.g., Darling 2008).  This is evidence of 
the continued reproduction of the market form.  Yet, the use of public money to 
shelter banks from harmful shifts in price signals represents an attempt to partially re-
embed finance back into society in order to stave off the threat of financial collapse.  
This amounts to the undermining of the market form through the introduction of 
distinctly non-market elements of regulation.  Market and non-market forms in 
contemporary finance thus exist side-by-side in Britain. 
 
Of course, what passes for society in this instance is not what Polanyi had in mind 
when he wrote about re-embedding market relations.  By ‘society’ he meant the 
beneficiaries of a progressive social policy, whereas in the remaining pages I will 
show that the bailout packages correspond directly to middle-class interests in 
avoiding incorporation into a progressive social policy.  This is exactly the sort of 
partial re-embedding of market relations within society – and that is partial in both 
senses of the word – which Polanyi depicted as being inherently unstable (Polanyi 
1957 [1944], 210).  It is the tensions embedded within the co-existence of market self-
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regulation and partial social protection which leads to social breakdown, he argued, 
not the system of market self-regulation alone.  Heightened awareness that special 
favours are being granted to some but not others is likely to be followed by 
increasingly open dissent aimed at the remaining elements of market self-regulation 
(ibid., 120).  I now move on to argue that the introduction of regulatory incoherence 
into British finance during the subprime crisis was legitimated through the 
development of a middle-class moral panic surrounding falling house prices. 
 
 
The Personalisation of the Subprime Crisis 
 
It was difficult in Britain to escape either the reporting of the fallout from the first 
phase of the subprime crisis or the strategies of personalisation which accompanied 
that reporting.  Unusually for a financial event it retained its capacity to consistently 
make the news.  Modern financial news tends to concentrate on price trends within 
the markets, as if the magnitude of the daily price change is more important than the 
economic context in which such changes occur.  The story of the first phase of the 
subprime crisis – at least insofar as it was reported in Britain – was the way in which 
the distress of the banking sector impacted upon the structure of house prices.  Actual 
house price changes; predicted house price changes; reports suggesting that actual 
changes would be greater than previously predicted; studies subsequently confirming 
the reports: all of these combined to ensure that there was always something different 
to be said about the housing market aftershock of the subprime crisis. 
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The continued newsworthiness of the subprime crisis was facilitated by the ease with 
which the focus on house prices was used to turn a public financial event into a 
personal struggle to survive global economic pressures unscathed.  Individual stories 
of mis-sold mortgages or of mis-sold properties provided salient tales of accelerated 
personal debt and increasing difficulties making ends meet as global economic 
conditions deteriorated, thus shattering illusions of the wealth that was to be unlocked 
by trading up on the housing market.  The subtext of so many news stories of this 
nature was: ‘could this happen to you?’.  It is well documented that the ‘might you be 
next?’ angle feeds a psychological response which keeps stories in the news: fear 
(Glassner 2000).  Constantly projected images of expected house price falls send a 
clear message that all is not well in the housing market.  It also taps into latent 
insecurities through the simple transposition of knowledge about the housing market 
as a whole into fear of the consequent implications for the price of one’s own house 
and one’s own exposure to housing market debt. 
 
There are no objective criteria which help to delineate a newsworthy event from any 
other.  ‘Newsworthiness’ is itself a social construction, depending on the ability to 
locate a story within socially generated criteria of what is and what is not appropriate 
for considered attention.  According to David Altheide (2002), recent changes in news 
journalism have increasingly oriented the content of reporting to the maintenance of 
societal ‘problem frames’.  Within such a context, events retain their significance to 
the extent to which they reproduce concerns that society is somehow ‘under threat’ 
and that the threat in question needs to be tackled.  Sociological studies of the late 
modern condition have confirmed the presence of personal anxieties which, when 
harnessed effectively, produce politically meaningful manifestations of societal siege 
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mentalities.  Zygmunt Bauman (2002) has written of a society of increasingly isolated 
individuals who temporarily come together to form collective bonds in a common 
‘ambient insecurity’.  This is suggestive of a latent desire to find means to articulate 
and give form to what otherwise might remain unspecified and unexpressed anxieties 
(see also Furedi 1997).  The reporting in Britain of the individualised fallout from the 
subprime crisis provided one such means. 
 
From Bauman’s perspective, individuals are mobilised to particular visions of the 
future via a process through which other people’s experiences are relayed into their 
consciousness and give meaning to fears which they might otherwise not have known 
they had.  The vicarious replaying of other people’s experiences through ‘what if …’ 
scenarios will often take the first person form in order to create the impression that the 
experience could well end up being theirs as well.  The result is the apparent 
confirmation that it was right all along to have those previously unspecified and 
unexpressed anxieties.  Insofar as this also confirms the particular vision of the future 
encoded in the original news reports, it typically leads to the institution of new subject 
positions.  The reports will be imprinted with a narrative form which draws attention 
both to the reason for the original problem and the subject position which reasonably-
minded members of the audience should adopt if they are to help enforce the 
necessary solution to the problem. 
 
This is where the inherently personalised content of the reporting of the fallout from 
the subprime crisis became so important.  The effect of audience interpellation to fear 
of house price falls was achieved by pairing reports of the general state of the housing 
market with carefully chosen illustrations of households struggling to make ends 
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meet.  This created a chain of equivalence which began with the distressed state of the 
banking sector, passed through the distressed state of the housing market and 
concluded with the image of individuals in distress.  Thus, the psychological distance 
which is likely to exist between most people in their conduct of everyday life and the 
imbalance in banks’ financial bottom lines is immediately reduced.  In this way, 
individuals could begin to ‘tune into’ the disarray of the banking sector by developing 
interpretive instincts which immediately translated evidence of banks’ balance sheet 
difficulties into justified fears about how this might impact upon them personally (on 
‘tuning in’ as semiotic strategy, see Innes 2004, 352-3).  They are interpellated to 
create for themselves the subject position of innocent victims of problems caused by 
other people. 
 
The illustrations of ‘individuals in distress’ therefore act to produce knowledge in 
much the same way as the role Thomas Kuhn attributed to scientific exemplars (see 
Kuhn 1977, 297-8).  For Kuhn, exemplars do not tell people things that they did not 
already know.  Instead, their purpose is primarily to educate people into viewing the 
world in a particular way.  They are designed to confirm particular theoretical 
dispositions in the minds of observers, but they do so because they only make sense 
when first having accepted as true the main claims of the theory (Kuhn 1981, 11).  
The illustrations of ‘individuals in distress’ contained in the reporting of the subprime 
crisis in Britain operated in much the same way.  They provided a means of 
visualising the world, but where the content of what might be seen was already 
largely pre-determined.  Audience members could only make sense of what is being 
shown to them if they were prepared to visualise themselves in the position of the 
distressed households contained in the report. 
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In this way, the reporting of the subprime crisis publicly imprinted its essential 
meaning through personalising the crisis.  Richard Ericson, Patricia Baranek and Janet 
Chan (1991) depict this as a developing feature of news discourse: the desire to bring 
the news as much as possible into people’s lives through dramatising public issues in 
such a way that they are subsequently interpreted as ‘private troubles’.  The news 
itself acts as a translation device to connect the two realms of experience – public and 
private – into something much more integrally formed than the simple factual account 
of an event which happened to a third party.  Fears of such an event being replicated 
in one’s own life can become wholly disproportionate to the likelihood of it actually 
occurring.  However, the fear on its own can often be enough to persuade people to 
alter everyday behavioural practices and to adopt the new subject position which is 
commensurable with the changed behaviour.  Audience members tap into their latent 
anxieties (here concerning their exposure to mortgage debt) to transpose the 
information about the original event (a falling housing market) into perceptions of that 
which makes them feel most vulnerable (the decline in the value of their own houses) 
(Slovic 2000). 
 
The criminological focus on signal crimes adopts this way of thinking.  The concept 
prioritises the process of social reaction through which a criminal event is not only 
reported as a statement of fact but, crucially, is also defined as a problem requiring 
personal adaptation (Ferraro 1995).  In the first instance the response is primarily 
psychological, in that it requires a personal reinvention of the self designed to 
minimise the threat of being subjected to the same sort of event.  But this also has 
behavioural implications.  The new self being created in the imagination will only 
 15 
result in minimising the risk presented by the signal crime if it is embodied in new 
ways of thinking and new ways of acting.  Signal crimes are thus interpreted as 
warnings about both the overall distribution of risk within a particular social space 
and the potential for that risk to become momentarily concentrated in the lives of 
people who would otherwise be only vicariously connected to the underlying event 
via a news report (Girling, Loader and Sparks 2000, 47). 
 
The first phase response to the subprime crisis in Britain contained many of the social 
reactions which criminologists associate with signal crimes, even though in most 
relevant cases a crime was not committed.  The banks might well have used the 
apparent protection of mortgage securitisation techniques to offer mortgages on 
predatory terms which increasingly required borrowers to stretch their personal 
finances beyond breaking point to meet repayments.  Yet, the vast majority of 
mortgages sold in this way were sold legally, even if a strong argument can be made 
that they were sold immorally.  Despite this, there is clear evidence that the response 
to the subprime crisis in Britain followed the established pattern of responses to signal 
crimes in the way in which discursively constructed fears travelled along specified 
lines of social demarcation.  The ‘responsible mortgage borrowers’ amongst Britain’s 
middle classes were alerted to the potential for systemic housing market risks to 
impact upon them personally, and this led to the search for a new understanding of the 
self and a new socially-demarcated subject position which would act as a partial 
immunisation against such risks. 
 
The reaction to signal crimes revolves around asking what ‘I’ must do in order to 
minimise ‘my’ chances of falling victim to a similar crime – i.e., how ‘I’ must change 
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my everyday behaviour in order to avoid the contexts in which such crimes arise.  In 
the case of the subprime crisis, by contrast, there was no directly analogous sense that 
the reorientation of one individual’s behaviour acting alone could generate feelings of 
enhanced security against falling house prices.  The ‘I’ ceases to be an effective actor 
in the midst of a beleaguered housing market, because houses are not priced 
individually so much as relative to an overall market rate (Case and Quigley 2008, 
164-5).  Another step was necessary in the response process: this was to translate the 
newly insecure ‘I’ into a ‘we’ which was capable of producing safety in numbers 
through collective action.  What was necessary was a second level of interpretation 
whereby the newly personalised trouble became re-animated as a public issue. 
 
In criminological terms, this is equivalent to the outbreak of a moral panic.  This 
requires the formation of a socially-demarcated group identity capable of substituting 
for the population as a whole and thereby speaking authoritatively in its name.  In the 
first phase response to the subprime crisis in Britain, the ‘I’ of the ‘responsible 
mortgage borrower’ was turned subtly into the ‘we’ of ‘responsible mortgage 
borrowers’.  This enabled claims to be made on behalf of the group with the apparent 
force of numbers behind them, thus adding to their ostensible moral weight.  It also 
allowed the group – in Britain, comprised of a distinctively middle-class membership 
– to seize the wider discourse of the subprime crisis in order to assert, as a matter of 
moral urgency, the alignment of its interest and the public interest.  I use the concept 
of middle-class moral panic in the following section to link the cultural politics of 
response to the subprime crisis in Britain to the pattern of government intervention to 
assist the banks embroiled in that crisis.  That is, I argue that the decision to introduce 
important elements of the non-market form into the regulation of finance in Britain 
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received a decisive imprint of legitimacy from the initiation of the middle-class moral 
panic. 
 
 
Middle-Class Moral Panic and the Subprime Crisis 
 
The Nationwide House Price Index reported an average fall across the British housing 
market of 18% for the period from October 2007 to December 2008 (BBC News 6 
January 2009).  Despite this incorporating the largest single annual decline yet 
recorded, when set against the sixty-fold increase in house price from 1967 to 2007 it 
looks to be a relatively minor short-term price phenomenon.  It merely reverses 
eighteen months’ worth of the 12% average annual increase between 1997 and 2007.  
In his influential micro-studies of public order, however, Erving Goffman has shown 
that ostensibly trivial occurrences can lead to often seriously disproportionate 
responses provided they tap into a sufficiently energised public mood.  The key to 
establishing calls for overreaction lies in the disturbance of the appearance of 
normality. 
 
The critical issue from this perspective is not so much how far house prices fell in the 
first phase of the subprime crisis as the fact that any decline at that time seemed to 
confront the social expectation of what represented normal housing market 
conditions.  During the recent bubble, constantly expanding valuations of the wealth 
locked-up in homeownership constituted the norm.  Indeed, that expectation was part 
of the process through which the bubble inflated.  Subsequent price falls have 
shattered this illusion of normality and, as Goffman predicted, they have consequently 
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led to a reconfiguration of how perceptions of both personal risk and social control are 
constructed.  All that is necessary to destabilise the subject positions associated with 
an extant social order is for the veneer of normal appearances to be broken (Goffman 
1972, 241). 
 
Moral panics arise from attempts to draw a clear demarcation between socially 
acceptable and socially unacceptable behaviour, where the sudden visibility of the 
socially unacceptable is responsible for disturbing the appearance of normality 
(Cohen 1972, 42).  The discursive strategy of demarcation is successful at the point at 
which certain forms of behaviour are encircled as ‘deviant’, whereupon one of two 
things might happen: (1) it becomes legitimate to withdraw rights from the groups 
which the dominant construction associates most directly with the deviant behaviour; 
or (2) it becomes legitimate to assign extra rights to the groups which the dominant 
construction associates with untainted behaviour.  Either way, it is a strategy of social 
division built upon the asymmetric allocation of rights in favour of the group who 
successfully comes to define what counts as errant and/or proper behaviour.  It is 
about a dominant group denying comfortable assimilation for everyone into its way of 
life and using the policy process to introduce asymmetric rights as a means of 
confirming that exclusion. 
 
Moral panics are often set within the context of a nostalgic image of an idealised past 
– a time at which additional rights did not need to be allocated to a dominant group 
because its existing rights were not considered to be under threat (Pearson 1983).  It is 
the idealisation which serves as the index for comparing today’s situation with 
‘normal appearances’, even if the substantive conditions prevailing at the previous 
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point of time were somewhat different to the representation of normality.  The 
inherent fragility of the house price bubble pre-2007 could thus be glossed over in the 
search for an effective nostalgia, one which might need to stretch back only to the 
time before the subprime crisis when the housing market was still outwardly healthy.  
The nostalgia serves as preparation for the directive that ‘something must be done’, a 
call to arms made possible only by the contrast to a time before the onset of more 
troubling circumstances.  The sharpness of the distinction between the two sets of 
conditions will almost certainly be an exaggeration, but the exaggeration itself serves 
a purpose.  It facilitates mobilisation to the idea that things might be different and that 
decisive action should be undertaken in order to restore the previous distribution of 
risk as it impacted upon the people seeking to popularise the moral panic. 
 
The narrative of moral panic thereby combines the discursively instituted ‘fact’ of 
social decay and the constantly reiterated possibility of reversing that decay.  In the 
context of the subprime crisis in Britain this related respectively to the collapsing 
housing market and the potential for restoring stability to house prices by rewarding 
‘responsible mortgage borrowers’ with a financial context which guaranteed the 
health of their housing stock investments.  The assistance given to banks to enable 
them to cleanse their balance sheets of underperforming mortgage-backed securities 
was justified publicly primarily because it coincided with the defence of ‘responsible 
mortgage borrowing’: in the official justification of policy recapitalising the banks 
would restore normality to the mortgage lending market and, in turn, this would then 
provide the conditions for sufficient levels of housing market activity to maintain the 
structure of house prices (HM Treasury 2008, 3-7).  In this way the first phase 
response to the subprime crisis in Britain more closely corresponds to (2) than (1) 
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above – enacting a social exclusion by ascribing additional rights to a privileged 
group. 
 
These rights were to be given specifically to members of the middle classes who had 
shown themselves to be good financial citizens in the eyes of the Government.  Such a 
designation was accorded to people who had responded positively to the Treasury’s 
encouragement to invest in assets which would create extra personal wealth for the 
future (e.g., HM Treasury 2001; see also Finlayson in this issue).  Middle-class 
incorporation into a system of asset-based welfare was routed primarily through the 
housing market during the recent house price bubble (Watson 2008).  The moral panic 
of ‘responsible mortgage borrowers’ directly followed middle-class incorporation into 
a system of asset-based welfare.  It is this which has politically conditioned the 
character of the Brown Government’s approach to bank bailouts.  Forcing the banks 
to take responsibility for their own balance sheet errors would have required them to 
price at the market rate their mortgage-backed securities and accept the subsequent 
losses.  But it would also have massively contracted the banks’ ability to activate 
mortgage lending, with noticeable knock-on consequences for house prices. 
 
The discursive power of a moral panic resides in its disciplining effects (Hay 1995, 
204-5).  Subsequent events are presented as confirmation of the legitimacy of the 
social boundaries drawn around the rights of the privileged group.  In the case of the 
first phase response to the subprime crisis in Britain each new report of predicted 
house price falls served to confirm the presence of the symptoms of social decay as 
experienced by the beleaguered middle-class mortgage borrower.  Such discourses do 
not resonate because of the sophistication of the way in which they reconstruct the 
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experience of a complex social event (McRobbie 1994, 199-200).  Rather, they allow 
people to dial-in their own experiences to the prevailing discourse by offering a 
simple story of why a person like them would be justified in feeling ‘under threat’. 
 
The character list for a successful moral panic of this nature usually contains a clear-
cut distinction between the self (under threat) and some sense of the other (who does 
the threatening) (Ungar 2001, 271).  The self-appointed other of ‘responsible 
mortgage borrowers’ has not been the banks responsible for selling subprime 
mortgages, because the capacity for easing middle-class housing market anxiety 
passes through preferential Government treatment of the banks.  This particular moral 
panic is somewhat unusual, because neither have those people who were sold 
subprime mortgages been conspicuously ‘othered’.  I say this despite the clear 
ascription of socially-excluded status to subprime borrowers in deciding who should 
be helped first by government interventions.  Nonetheless, it is noticeable that the 
exemplars of distressed mortgage borrowers in British news reports were 
overwhelmingly those who borrowed in an ostensibly responsible manner, who held 
prime mortgages and who believed that they had reasonable claims to be seen as good 
financial citizens.  It was people with good credit histories and a record of previously 
pristine financial behaviour who were presented as deserving of wider public 
sympathy. 
 
To sustain a distinctively middle-class moral panic of ‘responsible mortgage 
borrowers’ it was important not to create clear means of empathetic identification 
which transgressed the social boundary encircling those in the subprime sector.  To 
avoid this, most reports concentrated not on who had been mis-sold a mortgage but 
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the fact of the mis-selling and what this fact meant for the housing market as a whole.  
The personalisation of middle-class anxieties about falling house prices involved the 
general anonymisation of subprime mortgage borrowers.  In this way the discursive 
lines of demarcation between the two groups retained their solidity. 
 
The aim was not to present human interest stories which focused on the mechanisms 
by which ordinary people were sucked into the banks’ attempts to squeeze every last 
penny of profit out of the mortgage lending business by carving out the subprime 
sector.  Instead, it was to show that it was the financially literate, financially aware 
and financially conscientious members of the middle classes who could claim to be 
genuinely innocent victims of a subprime crisis which was the result of other people’s 
poor decision-making.  By downplaying the human interest aspect of stories about 
being in the subprime sector, the idea of being innocently in that sector was 
progressively lost.  That loss, as well as the oppositional logic of social demarcation 
on which it is based, was functional to making the case for state protection of housing 
market wealth to be almost exclusively a middle-class phenomenon. 
 
The significance of the solid demarcation between the two groups is that it facilitated 
a disproportionate response.  Almost all theorists of moral panic agree that 
disproportionality is the predominant feature of public authorities’ attempts to tackle 
the problem at source (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994, 174).  But here an important 
difference is apparent between criminal and financial moral panics equivalent to the 
two different approaches outlined earlier in this section.  Criminal moral panics depict 
the route to safety for the dominant group in the disproportionate punishment of the 
deviant behaviour of the subordinate group (Thompson 1998, 37).  In this context a 
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moral panic is successful to the extent that it secures appropriate deterrence effects.  
By contrast, it is unclear what impact deterrence effects could have in a financial 
moral panic.  Subprime mortgages have already been mis-sold, and the consequences 
for house prices are already apparent.  Deterring further use of the same mortgage 
financing techniques would be insufficient to restore the status quo ex ante to the 
pricing structure of the housing market.  A response other than disproportionate 
punishment of allegedly deviant behaviour is therefore necessary amidst financial 
moral panics.  In the first phase response to the subprime crisis in Britain it was the 
disproportionate assistance for the middle classes identifying themselves as 
‘responsible mortgage borrowers’. 
 
All of the Brown Government’s interventions to recapitalise banks have been encoded 
with this one core political feature.  The remaining personal wealth locked-up in the 
housing market was susceptible to banks being required to revalue their assets in line 
with market prices.  So, in an attempt to guarantee that wealth the Government 
released the banks from the need to value their underlying balance sheet positions in 
this way.  Providing the Bank of England with the capacity to issue new government 
debt to effect direct swaps of banks’ seriously damaged mortgage-backed securities 
secured such an outcome, as did allowing it to buy those assets at their old market 
price using cash.  The Government’s purchase of stakes in banks to allow them 
guaranteed access to state-sponsored credit lines was a third example; the creation of 
a public body from which banks could receive state insurance of their bad debts was a 
fourth. 
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Within this dual process of defending middle-class wealth and protecting the banks 
from full exposure to market forces, something important happened to the public 
regulation of the financial system in Britain.  It began to lose its internal coherence as 
an increasing number of ad hoc arrangements designed for short-term ameliorative 
purposes were bolted onto the underlying principle of market self-regulation.  The 
pattern of public regulation which emerged has taken a distinctive form.  From a 
Polanyian perspective, it looks like a fundamentally unstable balance between 
selective protection from the price system for those who were able to define the 
meaning of the subprime crisis to their own ends and no protection at all for those 
whose interests were not reflected in the dominant cultural construction of the crisis.  
Under the influence of the prevailing moral panic, the demand was not for a full-scale 
Polanyian re-embedding of finance in order to secure full societal protection from the 
repercussions of changing price signals.  It was only for the partial re-embedding of 
finance in order to protect middle-class wealth accumulated during the recent house 
price bubble.  The moral panic surrounding the subprime crisis was an effective 
means of activating such reforms. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In his classic study which kick-started academic interest in the sociological 
phenomenon of moral panics, Stanley Cohen (1972, 204) predicted that the 
emergence of these events would be a continuing feature of modern life.  “This is not 
because such developments have an inexorable inner logic,” he wrote, “but because 
our society as presently structured will continue to generate problems for some of its 
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members … and then condemn whatever solution these groups find.”  Viewed today 
as British politics continues to be embroiled in the prolonged fallout from the 
subprime crisis, these words have a prophetic ring to them.  The problem which 
society has created for so many subprime borrowers revolves around the expectation 
of the sheer normality of private homeownership.  The solution they found during the 
house price bubble which eventually came to an end in Britain in October 2008 
involved direct exposure to banks’ increasingly gratuitous and sometimes outright 
predatory mortgage lending techniques, the adverse effects of which subsequently 
became only too apparent. 
 
This is not to say that criminal and financial moral panics are formally identical.  In 
criminal cases, the trigger moment has a single and clearly identifiable perpetrator 
who can be named as such.  By contrast, no single subprime mortgage unravelled the 
pricing structure of the most recent house price bubble in Britain and so blame cannot 
be attributed to a lone deviant.  But there are important similarities which make the 
analogy between criminal and financial moral panics a useful one.  Most obviously, in 
both types of event, the image of ‘threats’ is appropriated in order to allow a dominant 
group to speak in the name of society as a whole, but to do so in a self-interested and 
almost wholly unaccountable manner.  In both types of event that voice is used to 
demand positive action from the state so as to ensure additional security for those who 
have constructed a discursive platform from which to articulate ostensibly legitimate 
grievances about feeling under threat.  In this way, discursive lines are drawn to 
encircle a socially-excluded group. 
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The most interesting aspect of the middle-class moral panic surrounding falling house 
prices in the first phase of the subprime crisis in Britain is that it was subprime 
borrowers and not the banks that came to form the socially-excluded group.  The 
banks appear to deserve genuine disapprobation from society for the way in which 
their reckless mortgage lending impacted adversely on the British economy as a 
whole.  Whilst many broadsheet accounts of the crisis certainly struck this tone at the 
time, it was not a distinguishing feature of the middle-class moral panic.  Indeed, the 
desired outcome of the successful institution of the moral panic – to defend middle-
class wealth already accumulated in housing stock (see also Hay in this issue) – 
passed directly through public forgiveness of banks and the recapitalisation of their 
credit lines using taxpayer money.  As such, the banks had to be integrated into the 
socially-included group alongside the middle classes in order to make the moral panic 
work politically.  It was consequently left to the people who were wantonly mis-sold 
mortgages by the banks to occupy the socially-excluded group. 
 
This is an outcome littered with asymmetric protective arrangements which disrupt 
the internal coherence of the regulatory regime and which also highlight the social 
tensions inherent in the political responses to the subprime crisis.  I have argued that it 
creates a generically unstable tension between what Polanyi identified as the market 
and the non-market form.  Coordination of economic activity via price signals has 
been maintained for every participant in the banking structure – with the single, but 
crucial, exception of the banks themselves.  A Polanyian perspective deems resulting 
arrangements to be fundamentally unbalanced and the precursor to a breakdown in 
social order.  This is because they are evidence of both purely self-interested middle-
class calls for protection and the unwillingness to contemplate the move to a 
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genuinely new system of financial regulation which would extend protection more 
broadly across society.  The institution of a successful moral panic of ‘responsible 
mortgage borrowers’ worried about falling house prices could well nullify the short-
term threat of the first phase of the subprime crisis to accumulated middle-class 
wealth.  Yet, it might only do so by ushering in rather more widespread social 
dislocation. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 This article was written with the financial assistance of a grant from the Economic and Social 
Research Council (number RES-000-22-2198).  A first draft was presented at the Warwick Subprime 
Workshop in September 2008 and I am grateful for the comments and advice received during those 
sessions.  I also wish to thank Adam Edwards from Cardiff University for first making me think more 
deeply about moral panics and signal crimes in the response to the subprime crisis. 
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